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Abstract 
 
The thesis addresses the recent acknowledgement to incorporate environmental aspects in 
international security politics. The study intends to examine if epistemic communities, within 
the resource scarcity school, is a plausible explanation for how and why environmental 
aspects are incorporated in the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). A text analysis was used to answer the first question in the thesis: how does the EU 
incorporate environmental aspects in the CFSP given the analytical tool? Informant 
interviews with key persons in the CFSP process together with the results from the text 
analysis were then used to answer the second question in the thesis: Can epistemic 
community participation in the CFSP negotiation explains the CFSP outcome? The results 
showed that epistemic communities’ participation in the CFSP process was verified and also 
perceived to have shaped the CFSP outcome. However, some caveats regarding direct 
causality should be kept in mind.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“…the most severe threats to security of human beings are environmental impact and climate 
change.” (SvD, 2008) 
 
This announcement from one vice president of the European Commission is interesting, 
because traditionally environment and security are kept apart. The debate on an expansion of 
the concept of security intensified during the aftermath of the Cold War and after the 
disappearance of the bipolar confrontation “non military” issues, such as environmental 
aspects, appeared on the international security arena (Andersson Scott et al 2007: 9; Buzan, 
Waever & de Wilde 1998: 9; Gleditsch 1998: 382; Raleigh & Urdal 2007: 675; Theisen 
2006: 5). The European Commission (2008) points out that “the scope [of security] has 
widened from the purely military to include broader political, economic, social, and 
environmental aspects.” Also, environmental degradation has been recognized as a “non-
military threat” to national and international peace and security in the United Nation’s 
Security Council (Elliot 2004: 210, Gleditsch & Nordås 2007: 2). This illustrates that the 
environment has gained a place within the international security debate, not only as a pure 
political issue, but also as a political security issue (Buzan et al 1998; de Soysa 2002, 2; 
Graeger 1996, 111; Ronnfeldt 1997, 474). Yet, it is not so clearly illustrated in what way and 
why. What can help explain this development? 
 Environmental issues could be embraced in international security politics because 
constituting objective threats to international security in terms of for example water scarcity 
leading to violent conflict. However, adjustment to incorporate environmental issues might 
also be understood by non-state actors advocating a broader security concept (Betsill & 
Corell 2008; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 54; Urdal 2005: 418; Weyand 1999). Arguably, 
the end of the Cold War triggered a search for a new concept of security,1 which is thought to 
have been advantageous for non-state actors such as epistemic communities within the 
environmental security field (Buzan et al 1998; Haas 1992). Scholars uphold that epistemic 
communities, often explained as knowledge-based policy networks of scientists with shared 
beliefs in cause-and effect relations, exert influence on policy.2 The way scientific arguments 
structure political environmental security debates, in comparison to other security sectors, is 
accentuated as exceptional especially regarding complex issues (Adler & Haas 1992; 373, 
                                                 
1 Besides military security, concerning the two-level interplay of armed offensive and defensive capabilities 
of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions which could be considered to be “traditional” 
security concept, there are a development to a broader security concept to include, among other issues, 
environmental concerns. See for example Buzan 1991: 433 
2 The epistemic community theory approach could be considered complementary to conventional 
international relations literature such as neorealism. See Dunlop 2000: 139. 
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Buzan et al 1998: 71-73, 77; Eriksson & Noren 2002: 16-17; Haas 1992: 1-4; Jordan 2005: 
164, 175). 
 The scientific theoretical debate of a broadened security concept began in the early 
1970’s, but it was not until the beginning of 1990’s that more empirical research was 
initiated. This first systematic research was conducted within the “resource scarcity school” 
and research findings emphasized an existing link between scarcity in renewable natural 
resources and violent conflict (measurement for security) (Homer-Dixon 1991: 77; Homer-
Dixon 1994: 36f; Ronnfeldt 1997: 474-475). Some researchers argue that a link between 
environment and security is scientifically not so clear-cut (Gleditsch 1998, 383-384; 
Lomborg 2001). But even though there are different understandings on a possible link 
between environment and security, the resource scarcity school is a substantial part of the 
environment and security debate. Moreover, epistemic communities from this strand of 
though have proven influential in shaping the foreign and security policy in for example the 
US (Buzan et al 1998, 1, 71; de Soysa 2001: 1; Timura 2001: 104-105). 
 To understand how and why environmental issues are incorporated in foreign and 
security policy, the articulated link between science and policy is interesting to depart from. 
With the character of an epistemic community, and due to its centrality in the environmental 
security debate, the “resource scarcity school’s” plausible influence on international security 
policy is elaborated in this thesis. This could bring more clarity to how and also, partly, why 
environmental issues are incorporated in international security politics in general. 
1.1 Exploring impact of epistemic communities on the CFSP in the EU 
Why environment and security in the EU? The European environmental security debate has 
recently been given public attention (DN 2008; SvD 2008). The changing security landscape 
is especially shown in the contemporary security thinking of the EU where increasing 
involvement in the work of providing for safety and security of, for example, the environment 
is present. Since the end of the Cold War the EU is struggling to obtain a “new” security role 
and environmental security is argued to have received attention around the mid 1990’s 
(Bremberg & Britz 2007: 3). The EU, as a system, also faces greater complexity with 
environmental governance in comparison to member states (Aggestam 2000: 20; Zito 2001) 
and the role of science in international relations is revealed more readily than it is in member 
countries (Boehmer-Christiansen 1996: 192). It is tempting to consider that the attention to 
environment and security in the EU might have coincided with the scientific environmental 
security research within the “resource scarcity school”. Due to the argued overlap between 
science and policy (especially regarding issues characterized with uncertainty), it is 
interesting to examine epistemic communities possible impact on the Common Foreign and 
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Security Policy (CFSP) in the EU to incorporate environmental issues (Haas 1992: 1-4; Zito 
2001: 465). The lack of understanding what political structures environmental concerns will 
produce, motivates the search for these plausible explanatory factors (Aggestam 2000; Buzan 
et al 1998: 71).  
1.2 Purpose and questions 
The thesis has a theoretical and an empirical purpose. The theoretical purpose is to contribute 
to how and why environmental issues emerge in international security politics, more specific, 
the CFSP in the EU. The thesis uses a theory testing approach, and should contribute to the 
epistemic community theory. The study should help understand if epistemic communities are 
a plausible explanation to the incorporation of environmental issues in the CFSP and 
addresses the following questions: 
 
1. In what way does the EU incorporates environmental aspects in the CFSP? 
2. Can epistemic community participation in the CFSP negotiation explain the CFSP 
outcome? 
 
The empirical purpose (measure possible epistemic community influence) is divided in two 
steps to help the realization of the theoretical purpose; text analysis and informant interviews. 
The first step is necessary for the second step and should answer how the EU incorporates 
environmental aspects in the CFSP. In the first step, the purpose is to compare the 
understandings of the “resource scarcity school” with the CFSP outcome to measure 
correlation (or lack of it) between the two. To accomplish the first step an analytical tool is 
created. The second step should help answering why environmental aspects are incorporated 
in the CFSP (causality). Here, the purpose is to examine if epistemic communities (with the 
“resource scarcity school” view) participated in the CFSP negotiation and if this possible 
participation could be linked to the possible correlation examined in the first step. 
2. Theoretical approach 
The theoretical section starts with a discussion of environmental security with a focus on the 
“resource scarcity school”. Then, several different factors that could have influenced 
international politics to incorporate environmental issues are related to epistemic 
communities and elaborated in brief. After this, the epistemic community theory as an 
influence on the CFSP in the EU is outlined with a connection to the “resource scarcity 
school”. 
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2.1 Renewable resource scarcity and the security debate 
After the end of the Cold War, conflicts along ideological dividing-lines declined and the role 
of renewable natural resources was by many understood as filling this gap (Buzan 1991: 
434f; Gleditsch 2001: 177; Gleditsch & Theisen 2006: 2). In the Cold War national states and 
military power were considered prominent in the geopolitical security concept and the 
environment is understood to have emerged in the post Cold War discussions about human 
security (Aggestam 2000: 19, 21; Dalby 2002: 95). Up until mid 1990’s environmental 
security was a poorly investigated subject, but in the latter half of the 1990’s empirical and 
theoretical knowledge have increased considerably (Buzan et al 1998: 1-4, 7, 9; Gleditsch 
2001: 178; Ronnfeldt, 1997: 473- 474; Theisen 2006: 5; Timura 2001: 105; Ullman 1983, 
133).  
 There is a large corpus of literature debating the content of a widened security 
concept including environmental degradation, but a uniform definition of “environmental 
security” is absent (Graeger 1996: 109-110; Timura 2001:105). One understanding of 
environmental security could be that it “…concerns the maintenance of the local and the 
planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all human enterprises depend” 
where it assumes that humankind is living beyond the carrying capacity of the biosphere and 
that humankind is responsible for turning the negative development around (Buzan et al 
1998: 8, 76, 80-81). An anthropocentric approach with a human security dimension is 
probably most commonly used, where human induced threats towards the biosphere and the 
planetary system as whole poses existential threats to all, or parts of, the human kind (Buzan 
et al 1998, 76-77, 79-80; Elliot 2004: 214; Gleditsch 2001: 177-179).3 The primary concern 
is if environmental degradation poses a threat to national or international security, for 
example the conflict potential of renewable resource scarcity, but also environmental 
inequality/distribution, political unrest and environmental migration (Elliot 2004: 201-202).  
2.1.1 The “resource scarcity school” and its main antagonists 
A vast amount of scientific research has developed and confirmed the neo-Malthusian fears 
about scarcity in renewable natural resources. However, in reality, empirical evidence is not 
so clear cut, and, arguably, the discourse suffers from methodological problems.4 There is a 
                                                 
3 There are other possible dimensions in the environmental security concept. One concerns non human 
induced threats towards human kind caused by natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes and one concerns 
human induced threats towards the biosphere and planetary system as a whole that poses threats towards 
other species than human kind. The latter one, regarding threats towards other species than humans, 
stresses the importance to secure the environment per se (the environment is threatened) and views 
environmental degradation equally serious as other military threats (for example potential resource scarcity 
induced violent conflicts). In this study the anthropocentric dimension is used. 
4 The resource scarcity school receive critic for being anecdotal, causal relationship vague, choosing cases 
on the dependent variable etc.  
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continuous debate between advocators of scarcity (often called neo-Malthusians) and 
advocators of abundance (often called Cornucopians) regarding the state of renewable natural 
resources.  
 The core of the resource scarcity school is the concern for how scarcity of renewable 
natural resources5 acts as constraints on human behaviour and may lead, or at least 
contribute, to insecurity (for example violent conflicts) (Andersson Scott et al 2007: 15; 
Gleditsch 2001: 178; Homer-Dixon 1999: 47-48; Kahl 1998: 80; Matthew 2008: 4; Theisen 
2006: 8). Large-scale warfare over renewable natural resources is considered to be small, but 
the resource scarcity school uphold that renewable resource scarcity could play a significant 
role in generating and exacerbating violent conflicts (armed) regionally or within countries 
(Dalby 2002: 96; Gleditsch 2001: 179; Gleick 1998: 571; Homer-Dixon 1999: 47-48, 82-85; 
Ronnfeldt 1997: 474-476). Scarcity in renewable natural resources resulting from for 
example climate change, pollution, increased demand or structural factors, could lead to 
increased competition due to increased grievance (steaming from, for example, 
marginalisation within societies), but also due to lower labour costs of rebel soldiers in times 
of scarcity could eventually produce violent conflict (Gleditsch 2001: 179; Gleditsch & 
Theisen 2006: 3; Matthew 2008: 3). Environmental stresses could coincide with political 
tension and unjust access to resources and aggravate existing conflicts (Dalby 2002: 97). In 
this sense, the resource scarcity school accentuate that scarcities of renewable natural 
resources could produce social negative effects, for example migration and constrained 
agricultural productivity, which could cause violent conflicts that tend to be “persistent, 
diffuse and sub-national” (Ehrlich 1996: 216; Homer-Dixon 1994: 39; Homer-Dixon 1999; 
Matthew 2008). Scarcity and depletion of renewable natural resources have for example been 
linked to the Rwandan genocide, ethnic clashes in Kenya, the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, 
Mexico, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and the civil war in Sudan (Theisen 
2006: 1).6 In opposite position of the resource scarcity school, Cornucopians argue that there 
is no noticeable scarcity in renewable natural resources. Even though there could be short-
time shortages of renewable natural resource, that could lead to insecurity, over time the 
marketplace will provide innovations and substitution for the shortages which makes 
                                                 
5 Renewable resources are e.g. water, forest, ozone layer and fertile soil. Renewable resources have a stock 
and a flow. They can also be divided in providing goods (fisheries) and services (stratospheric ozone), even 
though they could provide both (e.g. forest; provide timber and maintain regional hydrological cycles). 
6 One theory regarding resources and conflict concern the abundance of for example oil, diamonds and 
gold. See for example Dalby 2002: 97. It turns the resource scarcity school on its head claiming that 
violence over resources occurs to control abundant resources. However, environmental change are not a 
cause in this possible conflicts. 
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humanity better off than if the short-term scarcity had not occurred at all (Julian 1994; Julian 
1996; Lomborg 2001).7 
 The relative importance of the role of renewable resource scarcity and depletion in 
conflicts remains debated, but the resource scarcity school is emphasised to constitute a focal 
point of interdisciplinary research efforts. Even though the Cornucopian understanding has 
gained influence in for example financial ministries and the World Bank, the resource 
scarcity understanding is reflected upon as a “buzzword” within general discussions 
concerning international security in the US and Europe. A theoretical assumption is therefore 
that the neo-Malthusian understanding could be incorporated in security politics, such as the 
CFSP in the EU (Buzan 1991: 450-451; Dalby 2002: 95-96; Gleditsch & Theisen 2006: 8- 9, 
16; Matthew 2008:3; Ronnfeldt 1997: 474, 476-480; Theisen 2006: 1; Timura 2001: 104). 
Nils Petter Gleditsch upholds that: “I follow standard terminology in talking about 
‘environmental security’, but it might have been preferable to talk about ‘resource scarcity’.” 
(Gleditsch 2001:179) Not only is the resource scarcity school prominent in the scientific 
research. The World Watch Institute have adopted the view that environmental breakdown, 
large-scale population movements, rising competition over renewable natural resources are 
some forces that “are at the core of a number of conflicts” (Renner 2005: 3, 6). And also, the 
resource scarcity school’s strand of thought has gained support in for example environmental 
groups, environment ministries and other official bodies (Buzan et al 1998: 73-74; Gleditsch 
& Theisen 2006: 3-4; Homer-Dixon 1999: 29).  
 In the next section we address plausible influences on international security politics 
in brief. Then, epistemic community theory is elaborated to understand how these 
understandings (with a focus on the resource scarcity school) might have influenced the 
CFSP in the EU. 
2.2 Incorporation of environmental issues in foreign- and security policy 
Possible influences on foreign and security policy to incorporate environmental aspects are 
plentiful. Traditionally, the making of foreign and security policy has been analysed through 
a neorealist and neoliberal institutional lens. Simplifying somewhat, the foreign and security 
policy outcome could then be understood as calculations of relative and absolute advantages 
made by states depending on predefined national interests (for example survival of the state 
and interdependence) (Aggestam 2000: 24-25).8 Environmental issues gaining place in 
international security politics might be considered an effect of the actual, objective, threat 
                                                 
7 The two main understandings within the “resource school”, neo-Malthusianism and Cornucopianism, are 
fully incorporated and described in the analytical tool used in this study; see the two ideal types in the study 
design chapter for a detailed explanation of these two strands of thoughts. See section 3.3 for a presentation 
of the two ideal types. 
8 For a more detailed discussion on neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism see for example Nye 1998 
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environmental issues constitute toward international security (Barkdull & Harris 2002: 7; 
Berlin & Möller 2005: 2-3). Also, member states in the EU could be conditioned by domestic 
interests or that a decision could be electorally challenging. However, a constructivistic 
approach could challenge the analytical attention given to national states interests to explain 
environmental issues salience in security politics. In contrast to neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, constructivists accentuate that state interests are not “written in stone” and 
that state interests could be shaped and changed by surrounding conditions. In relation to this 
thesis, incorporation of environmental issues in foreign and security policy that might not 
only be influenced by member states in the EU or as a response to “objective” threats to 
national states interests (Berlin & Möller 2005: 15f; Boehmer-Christiansen 1996: 174).  
 The Copenhagen school is a critical constructivistic approach and argues that there is 
no self evident link between the objective substances of threat images and political agendas. 
With a securitisation process the Copenhagen school strives to illustrate that environmental 
issues could receive security status through an intersubjective process. The first step in the 
securitisation process is for an issue to be defined as an existential threat towards a referent 
object (for example the EU). Talking about environment in security terms refers to a 
“security move” or a “speech act” and is a rhetoric that stresses the urgency of an issue, that 
survival is at stake and if action is not taken to solve a situation it will be too late. The second 
step is when the rhetoric surrounding an issue gain broader acceptance and extraordinary 
measures to solve the situation are taken, or at least could be taken.9 The Copenhagen school 
argues that there could be hidden motives for wanting an issue to be a security issue. If 
securitised, the environment receives prioritised status in comparison to other political issues 
which could opens for actions otherwise not acceptable (Berlin & Möller 2005: 18f; Buzan et 
al 1998: 24, 30; Eriksson & Noren 2002). 
 Even though neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism shed light on and provide 
insight of international environmental cooperation and the dynamics in the international 
anarchic system, the theories lack ability to explain the sources of national interests or 
international institutions under conditions of uncertainty (Adler & Haas 1992; Nye 1988: 
248). Environmental security could be understood as one area of uncertainty for decision-
makers, at least when turning to the scientific debate outlined above, and Adler and Haas 
(1992) argue that epistemic community theory allow a different approach than “rational 
                                                 
9 Anxiety of the unknown leads to an experience of an uncontrollable situation. Together with how an issue 
is framed (urgent matter that must be given priority in comparison to other political issues) could have an 
impact on if an issue receives international security status. Eriksson & Noren accentuate that cognition 
(fear of the uncertain) and the politics of framing an issue (securitisation) are two factors necessary (but not 
sufficient) factors in the search for an explanation of why an issue is salient as a security issue. In this 
sense, security politics is an intersubjective process and contains an objective and subjective sense of what 
is actually threatening and what is perceived as threatening. See Eriksson & Noren 2002 and Buzan et al 
1998. 
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choice and reflective institutionalism” to explain sources of interest and international 
institutions, such as the EU.10 The study of epistemic communities and their impact on policy 
making could illuminate dynamics between the international structure and the choices of 
decision makers (Adler & Haas 1992: 367-369) and is arguably challenging to, or at least 
complementing, conventional international relations theories due to its knowledge based 
arguments (Dunlop 2000; Eriksson & Noren 2002: 16-17; Legro & Moravcsik 1999: 53).11 
 The Copenhagen school uphold that the strategy to talk about environmental issues in 
security terms (the logic of securitisation) is increasingly used by “environmental actors”.  
Non-state actors participating in international policy making independent of any national 
government or intergovernmental organization (Betsil et al 2008: 4, Christensen 2006: 28), 
such as epistemic communities within the environment and security debate could be 
advocating securitization of environmental issues.  For example, that renewable natural 
resources possibly are getting scarcer could be addressed in security terms to bring higher 
attention to the issue. Still, different non-state actors, not only epistemic communities, might 
matter in international environmental negotiations due to uncertainty encompassing 
environmental issues (Betsill & Corell 2008; Sebenius 1992: 325; Toke 1999). Epistemic 
communities could face problems of expanding scientific information to decision makers 
(Sebenius 1992: 325, 364-365) and environmental nongovernmental organisations could also 
push for environmental issues to receive security status, for example be “bearers” of a 
scientific understanding of environmental security. Gough & Shackley (2002: 332) argue 
that, to receive political attention epistemic communities and other non-state actors, such as 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGO), could work in combination. 
However, scientific knowledge is argued to play a significant role in addressing the problems 
of policy uncertainty that EU arguably faces in areas such as the environment (Zito 2001: 
474). Epistemic communities, with political empowerment deriving from e.g. their ability to 
translate consensual “authoritative” information into policy, and retraction if confronted by 
anomalous data, makes it compelling to focus on epistemic communities when examine 
international security politics (Dunlop 2000: 141-142; Howorth 2004: 229; Haas 1992: 55; 
Zito 2001: 466).12 The dynamics of epistemic communities are further discussed in the next 
to sections. 
                                                 
10 Epistemic community theory is elaborated in detail in the next section. 
11 Epistemic communities could help constitute a “world order”, but whether or not depends also on the 
extent to which the world order also is based on shared values, rather than individual state interests. See 
Adler & Haas 1992: 389. 
12 Eriksson and Noren (2002) outline other possible influences. Dramatic events could possibly affect an 
issues salience as a security issue, but it could also downplay its priority. Also the media is downplayed in 
this model over possible influences on the salience of security issues. 
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2.2.1 Epistemic community theory 
Epistemic community theory is arguably revealing a new political dimension due to 
epistemic community’s ability to persuade decision makers to conform to its consensual, 
knowledge driven, ideas without requiring more material forms of power (Adler & Haas 
1992:388; Sebenius 1992: 325; Zito 2001: 466). Without awarding epistemic communities a 
monopolistic position for influencing decision makers over other non-state actors such as 
ENGO:s, Haas points out that diffusion of new ideas and information provided by epistemic 
communities can be an important “determinant of international policy coordination” (Adler 
& Haas 1992: 373, 383, 389-390; Dunlop 2000:139). 
 Understood as a “non-state actor”, epistemic communities13 have expertise in a 
relevant issue area to decision makers, here in an international context, and participate in 
international policy-making independent of any national government or intergovernmental 
organization (Betsil et al 2008: 4, Christensen 2006: 285). Epistemic communities are 
emphasised to have potential influence on foreign and security policy by framing issues, 
diffusing and promoting new ideas (Zito 2001: 466) and to make a distinction from other 
non-state actors, Haas lays out a four step definition: “…a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area…from a variety of disciplines 
and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which 
provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a 
central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the 
multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions 
of validity that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise-that is, a set 
of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be 
enhanced as a consequence.” (Haas 1992: 3) 
 An epistemic community shares a common “interpretation of the science behind a 
problem and the broad policy and political requirements in response to it” (Dunlop 2000: 
140). However, information provided by epistemic communities is not “objective”; rather a 
product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena which indicates that 
                                                 
13 To exemplify Haas (1992) draws an example to with economists. Economists as a whole constitute a 
profession, while members of a particular subgroup of economists (for example Keynesians) may constitute 
an epistemic community of their own and systematically contribute to a concrete set of projects informed 
by their preferred understandings. An epistemic community can be of various sizes, but it should be in 
consensus (even though members may engage in internal and often intense debates). 
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science is influenced by expectations and personal judgments of facts (Chalmers 1999: 12; 
Haas 1992: 4). Yet, epistemic community theory assumes that decision makers are receptive 
to epistemic community’s information. Increasingly complex issues make decision makers 
more receptive in order to inform their choices and policies with “authoritative knowledge” 
which decision makers need (Barkdull & Harris 2002:84; Dunlop 2000:140; Chalmers 1999: 
24-26; Zito 2001: 466). Of course, as points of critic, epistemic communities could be driving 
their ideas to receive further funding and recognition. Epistemic communities are also 
criticized for undervaluing the role of informed politicians and that the decision makers could 
be selective by choosing epistemic communities information to motivate a decision instead of 
informing it, use the uncertainty in science to invite delay not action (Boehmer-Christiansen 
1996:174-175, 191; Dunlop 2000: 141; Zito 2001:467). But still, the evaluation of threats 
within a timeframe that stretches beyond the generations of today lead to a unique form of 
dependence of academic authority and epistemic communities might be able to frame an 
issue and help define decision-makers interests (Adler & Haas 1992: 373; Buzan et al 
1998:71-72). For example, when scientific institutions began to seek active involvement in 
policy making regarding climate change, it was one factor that helped bringing world 
political salience of the issue (Boehmer-Christiansen 1996: 178). Even though the political 
agenda could be shaped by short term-based influences, the overlap between science and 
policy outcome should be present. Buzan et al point out the growing power of epistemic 
communities, for example due to their transnational character and accessibility for decision 
makers (Buzan et al 1998:73; Gough & Shackley 2002: 332). 
 Adler and Haas (1992) advocate that epistemic communities could exert influence on 
decision makers in the policy process, by innovation and diffusion.14 Policy innovation refers 
to framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue. Epistemic community 
could, by framing the context, offering expert advice and consultation, influence policy 
makers expectations and behavior (Adler & Haas 1992: 375-378).15 Policy diffusion refers to 
communication of the information provided by epistemic communities. Without international 
communication (for example conferences) new ideas and policy innovations would remain 
confined to the scientific group. This implies that is not only the content of information that 
creates influence, but also epistemic community activities aiming to disseminate information 
(scientific expertise) transnational (Adler and Haas 1992: 380-381).16 Betsil and Corell 
                                                 
14 Also two other steps are mentioned, policy selection and policy persistence, but these first to steps 
(innovation and diffusion) is more relevant here because the other steps concern more implementation of a 
policy rather than the inclusion of it. 
15 In this study the controversy could be understood as environmental security, and what is investigated 
influenced is the CFSP outcome. 
16 In this thesis epistemic communities that share the neo-Malthusian view (resource scarcity school) are of 
interest. 
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(2008) argue that influence is based both on participation in the policy process, but also that 
the participation in the policy process has an effect on the actual policy outcome. “Influence 
occurs when one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s 
behaviour from what would have occurred otherwise” This definition emphasises 
communication, for example participation via submitting information to negotiators, giving 
technical information and claiming legitimacy. Participation is, however, not enough. The 
definition also includes a focus on the effect of participation, if the participation was 
successful in shaping the political outcome. Epistemic communities influence decision-
makers though communication, where communication and action are intermeshed (see Adler 
& Haas 1992: 389, Betsill & Corell 2008: 24, 26-27). Epistemic communities could influence 
one national member state of the EU and then its influence is the function of that states 
influence over other member states, but other actors than merely states such as institutions in 
the EU could also take notice of epistemic community information (Adler & Haas 1992: 378; 
Zito 2001: 467). Epistemic community theory also seems to assume that decision-makers 
actively are searching for the information provided by epistemic communities (in certain 
areas) which then enhances the diffusion. To have influence on policy, epistemic 
communities do not have to be large, but researchers need to be respected in their own 
disciplines and consensus could be helpful (Eriksson & Noren 2002: 16). Also it is easier to 
gain influence where the cost of obtaining the relevant information is high and where there is 
an intense and vital debate concerning the policy issue. Political debates are more likely to 
dominate in difficult political areas while in less divisive issue areas, bureaucratic policy 
makers are more likely to rely on status quo solution and operational goals contained within 
their own organisation (Zito 2001: 467). In the next section epistemic communities influence 
on foreign and security policy is outlined.  
2.2.2 Epistemic community theory’s influence on foreign and security policy 
What plausible links are there between epistemic communities and foreign and security 
policy in particular? It is argued that epistemic communities could influence policy, even 
though foreign and security policy that has been considered immune to such forces (Howorth 
2004: 229). Sugden (2006) uphold that epistemic communities have proven to contribute to 
security sector reform in the United Kingdom by offering a “holistic approach” to security 
sector governance. Identifying included experts (and also excluded) and to establish a causal 
link between cognitive influence and actual policy change is considered a demanding 
research task, but even though Sugden argue that epistemic community theory is important to 
understand policy change, also in security politics (Sugden 2006: 9, 16).  
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 Foreign and security matters might include policy styles or closely held beliefs might 
not allow an epistemic community to diverge strongly from, in this study, the EU:s interests. 
Epistemic community could be conditioned by international structural realities (Nugent 2006: 
504; Zito 2001: 467). On the one hand the CFSP in the EU is not seldom perceived to be an 
intergovernmental negotiation issue area, associated with the essence of national sovereignty, 
where scientific knowledge might be downplayed if epistemic communities do not manage to 
influence a member state (or several member states) that can bring the understandings into 
the CFSP (Zito 469). But on the other hand, without exaggerating, the CFSP is also described 
as a political area of increasingly supranational character. This could indicate that epistemic 
communities could influence not only via member states (Nugent 2006, 504f; Smith 2004: 
740; Tonra & Christiansen 2004: 1). 
 As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War triggered a search for a more broad 
security concept to include environmental issues. The resource scarcity school as an 
epistemic community in the environmental security field (possibly also other understandings 
such as Cornucopianism) could therefore have been advantageous informing foreign and 
security policies (Haas 1992). New developments accelerate the diffusion process. It lends 
urgency to revaluating current policies and to seeking alternatives. The emergence of 
environmental security research findings within the resource school in particular and the 
possible explanatory power of epistemic communities to could help understand why 
environmental issues are appearing in international security politics (Adler & Haas 1992: 
380-381, Timura 2001: 104). 
2.3 Limitations 
Regarding spatial limitation, to disentangle the possible effects of epistemic communities 
from those of, for example ENGOs, which also put effort into influencing international 
environmental policy is beyond the scope of this thesis. The center of attention is epistemic 
communities. Due to its centrality in the environmental security debate only the possible 
influence of epistemic communities within the resource scarcity school, on the CFSP in the 
EU outcome, is examined. Possible epistemic community influence via member states in the 
EU is also left outside the coverage of this thesis (even though, surely interesting tasks). 
 Time is limited according to the recent acknowledgement of environment aspects in 
relation to the CFSP in the EU. Thoughts about a united EU, how to overcome anarchy in the 
system has been present. But it was not until the end of the 1990s (with the Maastricht treaty) 
that discussions of integrated security politics took place (Aggestam 2000: 38, 40; Nugent 
2006: 352) Up until the late 1990’s the EU had no military component at all and it was not 
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until 2003 that a security strategy developed in the EU (The Council 2008a). Therefore, 2003 
to 2008 is time reference in this thesis (comparison over time is not an ambition). 
3. Study design 
Betsill and Corell (2008) provide a comprehensive analytical framework for assessing non-
state actor influence on international environmental negotiations. This thesis could be 
understood as a “light version” of their framework. Betsill and Corell argue that influence is 
divided in two related parts; participation in the policy process and effect on the policy 
outcome (correlation). By collecting data regarding participation and correlation, Betsill and 
Corell measure influence on a three degree scale; low (only participation), moderate 
(participation with effect on the negotiating process) and high influence (participation with 
effect on both the negotiating process and the actual outcome). Due to lack of time, but also 
because of difficulties finding information, the moderate level is excluded in this study. Here, 
the importance is if epistemic community understandings correlate with CFSP outcome, and 
if participation is verified to be linked with this correlation. To lower arbitrary estimations of 
“high or low” influence a point of reference could be used (Esaiasson et al 2007: 169-171). 
Betsill and Corel’s framework provides a reference point for this study; influence is low 
when epistemic community only participated in the CFSP process, for example via 
conferences and hearings. Influence is high when epistemic community understandings 
correlates with the CFSP outcome, when participation of epistemic communities with this 
view is verified to have shaped, at least to some extent, the CFSP outcome and when the 
participation verified in the interviews could be confirmed by other documents or research.17 
 The chapter’s first step is to examine plausible correlation between the resource 
scarcity school (the independent variable) and the CFSP outcome (the dependent variable). 
This is a necessity for the second step; to understand if epistemic communities (within the 
resource scarcity school strand of thought) participation in the CFSP process can explain the 
possible CFSP outcome. 
3.1 Descriptive text analysis to measure influence in policy outcome 
One commonly used method, when investigating influence of science on policy, is to 
compare “understandings” of the non-state actor with the political outcome (Adler & Haas 
1992; Haas 1992; Yee 1996: 77). A text analysis is used to describe and systemize the 
                                                 
17 One different approach to lower arbitrary estimations might be to compare the CFSP in the EU with for 
example the African Union. But this is also a rather broad approach considering the material for the text 
analysis and from the informant interviews on two cases would increase noticeable. To draw conclusions 
regarding high influence constitute of three elements (verified participation, verified links and by me 
confirmation that the non-state actors mentioned as epistemic communities could be thought of being 
epistemic communities looking at the definition outlined earlier in this study). Only interviews make it 
difficult to draw conclusion of high influence. 
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content of the dependent variable, the CFSP outcome (Esaiasson et al 2007: 239-240). It is an 
important part in trying to determine influence of epistemic community on politics, but 
reveals nothing of possible mechanisms of causality (Betsil and Corell 2008: 71). 
3.1.1 Analytical tool 
The created tool encompasses two polarised ideal types taken from two main conflicting, 
opponent, theories in the “resource school” realm; neo-Malthusianism and Cornucopianism 
(Gleditsch 2001:187; Homer-Dixon 1999: 34). The neo-Malthusian ideal type incorporates 
the resource scarcity school’s understandings and Cornucopianism is brought in to the 
analysis as an opposite ideal type to have a point of comparison. When examine if the neo-
Malthusian theory can be found in the CFSP or not, the Cornucopian ideal type is used as a 
“counterbalance” to realize if it is instead the opposite view that gained influence. The 
essence of the ideal types is presented in two levels: view of the present and view of the 
future regarding the relationship between renewable natural resources (environment) and 
violent conflict (security).18 Possible correlative features and similarities (or absence of them) 
should be found when comparing the CFSP outcome with the two ideal types (Esaiasson et al 
2007: 159). 
 The ideal types should be mutual exclusive (clear difference between them). The 
chosen theories should capture the essence of the “resource school’s” main arguments and be 
fully covered (presumed to cover possible aspects of the phenomena in the issue-area 
studied).19 Further, they should also be parallel (one feature on in one ideal has an opposite in 
the other) (Esaiasson et al 2007: 156f, 161-162). The analytical tool does not rely on a former 
analytical tool. Unfortunately other analytical tools, to depart from and develop further, were 
not found. The process of developing the analytical tool has been dedicated to defining 
proper contrasting characteristics of the two ideal types, rooted in the two theories, to help 
the realization and validity of the investigation. 
 The two ideal types are only a help to understand how the EU incorporates 
environment in the CFSP (extreme pictures of a phenomenon and can not be found in their 
pure form in reality) (Esaiasson et al 2007: 158). A predefined approach is preferable because 
                                                 
18 When creating the tool one more level was considered: solutions. This could bring a more nuanced 
analysis. For the purpose of the text analysis, to measure correlation between the neo-Malthusian ideal type 
and the CFSP outcome, this third level is not necessary. The essence of the two theories could be 
considered integrated in the tool (if renewable resources imply violent conflicts due to scarcity and if this is 
considered to worsen over time). 
19 There are especially one more theory that could be included in the analytical tool; resource abundance 
theory regarding for example diamonds, gold and oil. This theory is excluded in this study because 
renewable natural resources are in focus. This could be thought to be closer attached to the “necessary” 
environmental needs, basic needs in contrast to “luxury” natural resources such as gold and diamonds. 
Also, as mentioned above, this theory does not include environmental change. See for example Gleditsch 
and Nordås 2007, de Soysa 2002 and Dalby 2002. 
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it allows independence from the text itself. For this study it would be inappropriate with an 
open approach for the reason that it would eliminate the possibility to find a possible 
correlation between the “resource scarcity school” and the CFSP outcome. A predefined tool 
also facilitates motivation of conclusions, presenting the result and focusing on the thesis 
purpose (Esaiasson et al 2007: 244f). The ideal types are presented in section 3.3 and the 
analytical scheme (Table 1) is outlined in section 3.4. 
3.1.2 Criteria’s for conclusions regarding influence on outcome 
If the resource scarcity school’s understanding and the understanding embedded in CFSP 
outcome regarding natural resources are similar (closer to the neo-Malthusian ideal type) 
claims of correlation could be made. Epistemic community theory could be conditioned by 
structural realities which could make it difficult to see a possible correlation. Similarity must 
not be in exact term, but the essence should be present (Betsil & Corell 2008:27). The 
analytical tool should also help determine if the neo-Malthusian view isn’t present, the 
Cornucopian ideal type is used to understand if it is rather the opposite view that correlates. 
 The results will be stipulated and depend on my interpretations and judgments of the 
material. However, ideal types with good theoretical connection could reduce some of my 
influence. I strive to clearly describe the criteria’s for conclusions, to address the material 
objectively and present a fair picture given the analytical tool. The two ideal types, instead of 
just one, also make conclusion motivations and sorting formulations in the material easier 
(Esaiasson et al 2007: 158). The result is presented and estimated in terms of “closer” or “far 
from” an ideal type instead of “more” or “less”. I should be careful trying to determine that 
one ideal type is brought up more than the other (Esaiasson et al 2007: 160) and also be 
aware of the difficulty to decide when natural resources are important and when they could 
be of importance to generate violent conflict. A scale for guidance is used for conclusions 
(see analytical scheme Table 1). 
 Interpretation- and boundary establishment is a challenge (Esaiasson et al 2007: 254). 
This is addressed by openly discussing in which “box” in the analytical tool a “CFSP-
statement” is placed.20 A clear distinction between the content of the original text and my 
own analysis is important (Esaiasson et al 2007: 253). The result will be presented in 
citations (in italic), motivated conclusions and short summaries. 
                                                 
20 A friend (political science student) has also analysed difficult “CFSP-statements”. Independent of mine 
interpretation CFSP statements was place in the same place in the analytical tool, which increases the 
reliability of the text analysis. 
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3.1.3 Material for text analysis 
The material decision is a critical step in the thesis and should be chosen with caution. A 
preceding step is to identify the idea carrier (Esaiasson et al 2007: 246-249). The material 
should express how the EU incorporates environmental aspects in the CFSP outcome. The 
CFSP is mostly an intergovernmental policy issue. The Council of Ministers (the Council) is 
considered the very heart of the CFSP negotiation (Nugent & Paterson 2006: 505; Hayes-
Renshaw & Wallace 2006: 1), but since 1992 the European Commission (the Commission) is 
considered to be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP21 (Nugent & Paterson 
2006: 509). Hence, material is taken from the Council and the Commission.22 A wide idea 
carrier brings sufficient material to the analysis and incorporates the “cooperation” between 
the Commission and the Council in CFSP matters. Even though two different institutions 
might have different ways of working with CFSP issues the overall picture is important. To 
exclude one would be to exclude an important input to the CFSP. The text analysis uses two 
documents; the European Security Strategy (ESS) elaborated by the Council and the joint 
report Climate Change and International Security (CCIS) from the Commission and the 
Council’s High Representative.23 The contemporary security concerns of the EU are mainly 
manifesting in the ESS from 2003 (Bremberg & Britz 2007) and the report CCIS from 2008 
describes how environmental aspects are incorporated in the CFSP outcome (The Council 
2008c). This could illustrate security politics in the EU in a broad sense (Aggestam 2000:40). 
Two central documents to express the CFSP outcome regarding how the EU incorporates 
environmental aspects are also preferable in the informant interviews that goes deeper in 
explaining the CFSP outcome (see section 3.2.1).24 Also, there was not a broad material to 
choose from regarding environmental aspects in the CFSP in the EU. 
3.2 Interviews to measure influence by participation 
The thesis second question addresses if epistemic community participation in the CFSP 
negotiation can help explain the CFSP outcome (the two documents) and if the link between 
possible participation and outcome is verified. There is a presumption that epistemic 
community may have played a causal role in influencing policy outcome if correlation is 
present, but to spot a causal connection (if epistemic communities actually caused the effects 
                                                 
21 The Commission has a coordinating role, can make proposals in CFSP matters and between the 
Council’s High Representative and the Commissioner for foreign affairs there are close cooperation. 
22 The so called hidden agenda is difficult to determine and study because of low availability of empirical 
material. It is also not necessary in this thesis. The material is taken from the official agenda of the EU. See 
Eriksson & Noren 2002 for a discussion of the closed and open political agenda. 
23 The High Representative of the CFSP is responsible for initiating, implementing the politics of CFSP in 
the Council. Both documents are adopted by the Council and could therefore be argued to be an important 
part of the CFSP outcome. 
24 Articles and statements about environmental issues in the CFSP could be fruitful for the descriptive 
purpose, but for the second step in the thesis it is not preferable. 
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in the outcome) is complex (Yee 70-71, 76; Adler & Haas 1992: 387; Betsill & Corell 2008). 
Therefore, influence should include participation and if this participation is linked to the 
possible outcome correlation (Betsil & Corell 2008). 
 Under complicated circumstances to obtain information and when complexity 
regarding a causality link is high interviews could be used (Esaiasson et al 2007: 287). 
Epistemic community participation could be examined by reviewing the CFSP process and 
identifying epistemic communities’ participation in the policy process (which actors 
participated in conferences, hearings etc). But in this study, interviews are more accessible 
and could be a first step to receive information of perceived epistemic community 
participation in the CFSP process (Dunlop 2000: 140; Sugden 2006).25 The CFSP process 
could also be considered a closed issue area in the EU which would risk not receiving 
material if relying on for example document studies of possible epistemic community 
participation. 
3.2.1 Interview guidance 
Informant interviews should answer if epistemic communities (within the resource school 
strand of thought) participated in the CFSP process. If the correlation was present in the text 
analysis, interviews also should address if the possible participation is thought to be linked to 
the CFSP outcome. Verifying linkages concerns if the outcome would have been different if 
epistemic communities didn’t participate and if it was epistemic communities that actually 
brought an understanding into the CFSP outcome.26 The interview guide, with short and 
simple questions (see Appendix 1), helps conduct interviews. It is important that both themes 
(participation and linkages) receive attention in the conversation (Esaiasson 2007: 258, 298f). 
The questions have a theoretical approach and also derive from the text analysis result.27 
 Interview participants are selected in line with the principle of intensity, centrality. 
And the participants are considered strategic “expert” within the CFSP process and could be 
used as sources (Esaiasson et al 2007: 257, 261, 291). Employees at the Commission and the 
                                                 
25 Measurement of epistemic community influence via member states (multilevel approach) is not included, 
which is a lack of this study (e.g. influence via the presidency is not provided), but as mentioned above the 
CFSP process is not strictly intergovernmental and it could be possible to examine direct participation on 
decision-makers at the Commission and the Council via informant interviews. Sugden (2006), Haas (1992) 
and Zito (2001) also uphold that epistemic community theory is applicable not only on domestic level, but 
also on an international level. Furthermore, epistemic community theory assumes that decision-makers and 
epistemic community are “drawn” to each other (the first one seeking information, the latter providing it) 
which could further motivate the possibility of measuring epistemic community participation via the 
Commission and the Council. 
26 By Betsill and Corell (2008) this is called “process tracing” and “counter factual control” and is 
important to understand if it actually was participation by a certain actor than affected a certain political 
outcome. 
27 The interview guide does not cover other explanations than non-state actors (where epistemic 
communities are in focus). Other explanations are possible, and surely interesting, but it is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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Council, that have been working with, preparing and formulating the ESS and the CCIS, 
could provide information if epistemic communities within the resource scarcity school 
participated in the CFSP process, and, depending on the first step, if epistemic community 
participation is linked to the CFSP outcome.28 Even though there are some difficulties 
associated with informant interviews, for example that participants reject to reveal informal 
contacts with epistemic communities and that participants might not have enough 
information, interviews is one first step in examine participation of epistemic community in 
the CFSP (which is considered to be a rather closed issue area). Using informant interviews, 
there is also a potential problem of not having enough interview participants. It is hard to 
replace participants (Esaiasson et al 2007: 295) and therefore an anonymous procedure was 
promised.29 A thesis description together with a request of participating in an interview was 
sent, via email, to possible participants to make the first contact (see Appendix 2). In this 
thesis, three interviews were conducted over the phone (in English), due to lack of time and 
financial resources (travel costs). This could have troubled the reliability, for example 
because of misunderstandings, language barriers and stress in the conversation (Esaiasson et 
al 2007: 70).30 All three of the interview participants were involved in writing the CCIS 
report, and one of the interview participants also had experience from the ESS.31 A finished 
version of the thesis is sent to the interview participants. 
3.2.2 Criteria’s for conclusions of the second part 
Analysing the interview results the point of reference in this study provided by Betsill and 
Corell is used. Influence is low when epistemic community only participated in the CFSP 
process, for example via conferences and hearings. Influence is high when epistemic 
community understandings correlates with the CFSP outcome, when participation of 
epistemic communities with the resource scarcity school is verified to have shaped, at least to 
some extent, the CFSP outcome and when the participation verified in the interviews could 
be confirmed by other documents or research. If epistemic community theory is useful as a 
“new political dimension”, the interviews should at least mention epistemic communities’ 
                                                 
28 Here, the interest is the process, if epistemic communities were present or not (and if there is a linkage to 
the CFSP outcome), therefore the interviews are of informant character. The interest is not gaining 
understanding of the interview participants “conceptions” and “general thoughts” of epistemic communities 
in the CFSP outcome. 
29 This was also the wish of the interview participants. They can be understood as expressing the “voice” of 
the Council or the Commission and did not feel that their names were necessary. 
30 A test interview was conducted before the actual interviews. Still, testing the interview guide on a friend 
is not the same as testing it on a person in “similar” position as the interviews participants. But the test 
interview might have provided better fluency and ease in the conversation to ensure reliability somewhat 
more. 
31 When searching for interview participants by calling different units at the Council and General 
Directorates at the Commission I found that the three interview participants were the most relevant to 
interview (because they were always referred to by others working in the Council or the Commission). 
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presence in the CFSP process.32 One difficulty could be to measure epistemic communities in 
the interviews; do interview participants have the same understanding of epistemic 
communities used in this thesis? Still, indicators such as scientific communities, single 
scientists, academic communities, academic experts, scientific bodies and scientific 
institutions could be reasonable indicators of epistemic communities given that the interviews 
are conducted the clear and thorough way mentioned above.33 Epistemic communities’ 
participation could be considered not to be verified if non-state actors are considered 
excluded from the CFSP process, but also if other non-state actors are pointed out as 
participation and shaping the CFSP outcome instead of epistemic communities. 
 Probably the interviews, to some extent, could be suffering from unwanted effects in 
the conversation. Interview participants might be keen to answer a question that they have 
never thought about and the answers could also depend on who is asking the questions 
(Esaiasson et al 2007: 265-266, 301). I strive to discuss openly if I believe that the result is 
affected by the interview situation. 
 Informant interviews, as a method, advise reflection over reliability of the narratives 
(Esaiasson 2007: 303). Narratives from the interviews could be understood as primary 
sources. Interview participants are answering about courses of events that they have 
experienced in their CFSP related work during the “preparation” of the two documents. The 
distance between the narrator and the narrative could be considered close in time, at least 
with regard to the CCIS (2008). However, with regard to the independence of the narrative, it 
is difficult to know if “possible expectations” affect the participant’s answers. Even though 
interview participants come from different institutions in the EU, they are argued to be in 
close cooperation. Also, the tendency of the narrators is hard to determine. If the interviews 
give information regarding a scientific group participation in the CFSP process, I will try to 
find confirming narratives with different origin, for example search for other confirming 
documentation. This could make the results more reliable. 
3.2.3 To generalise the results? 
In this study only one case is examined. Could the study generalise to other contexts other 
than the EU? Due to the time and spatial limits in the thesis there are small claims on 
generalizing the result to other international organisations such as the African Union. More 
                                                 
32 Epistemic communities are one possible explanatory factor examined in this thesis. Yet, other diverse 
explanatory factors might arise in the interviews (e.g. other non-state actors). These will be briefly 
mentioned in the result – but the focus is still on if epistemic communities within the resource scarcity 
school were participating or not and if this could have been linked to the CFSP outcome. A review of 
mentioned non-state actors will therefore focus on epistemic communities. 
33 Even though it could be difficult to outline if a mentioned epistemic community fulfil the definition in 
the thesis, at least we could try to discuss if the mentioned epistemic community could relate to the 
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studies must be conducted to enable broader generalizations. For this, the analytical tool 
could be considered universal to validate the results in other contexts. 
3.3 Presentation of the ideal types 
3.3.1 Neo-Malthusianism 
 
Environmental scarcity has insidious and cumulative social impacts, such as population 
movement, economic decline, and the weakening of states. These can contribute to diffuse and 
persistent sub-national violence. The rate and extent of such conflicts will increase as scarcities 
worsen (Homer-Dixon 1994: 36). 
  
With origin in Thomas Malthus (Malthusianism) limits of growth theory, supported mainly 
among ecologists or biologist, neo-Malthusianism emphasises Earth’s physical limits 
(Ehrlich 1996: 216; Myers and Julian 1994: xiii, 127; Homer-Dixon 1999: 28, 43; Ayers 
1993: 189). In the 1990’s neo-Malthusianism (the resource scarcity school) developed to 
integrate distributional aspects (de Soysa 2002; Gleditsch 2001; Urdal 2005) and coined the 
term “environmental scarcity” which includes three components; supply, demand and 
structural induced scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1991; Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon 1999: 
49-52, 177). The supply induces scarcity refers to physical availability of renewable natural 
resources. Neo-Malthusians argue that causal relationships within environmental systems to 
be sharply nonlinear mathematical functions (exhibit threshold effects); environmental 
systems could answer incrementally and slow to human intervention for a long time and then 
suddenly change character (Homer-Dixon 1999: 37).34 Important environmental factors are 
for example extreme events (for example global warming might result in crop-devastating 
droughts), ramifying character of scarcities in interdependent environmental systems and 
interaction among human impacts on these systems (for example over extraction in one area 
can affect surrounding ecological systems and synergistic outcomes). It is uncertain when 
Earth might reach a threshold with complex, unpredicted and perhaps highly undesirable 
outcomes (Homer Dixon 1999: 40-41). Neo-Malthusians argue that life-support systems of 
civilization are being pushed closer to their limits and that environmental damage could 
become irreversible, for example ozone depletion and climate change potential to destabilize 
civilization’s life-support system and declining resources such as cropland, forest, water and 
fish (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1996: 216). The ecosystem characteristics could imply that societies 
                                                 
34 Ecosystems is much more vulnerable than they once was regarded being. The Torontogroup argues that 
twenty thirty years ago ecosystems were regarded stable and resilient. 
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must be able to supply more social and technical ingenuity35 to adapt to rising environmental 
scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999: 43-44, 179; Kahl 1998: 80-81). Demand induced scarcity 
refers to population size and per capita demand. For example a boost in demand speeds 
demand induced scarcity and decrease availability of renewable natural resources. 
Consumption and population growth, according to neo-Malthusians, could be important 
factors in environmental deterioration and conflict (Ehrlich 1996: 216; Ehrlich et al 1993: 1-
2; Dimond 2006: 312-313). Structural induced scarcity refers to relative access to resources 
of different groups and unequal distribution that concentrates a resource for some groups 
which subject other groups in greater average scarcity. These three sources to scarcity (singly 
or in combination) could produce negative social effects (constrained agricultural 
productivity, constrained economic productivity, migration of people searching a better life, 
disruption of institutions (for example governments), insurgency and ethic clashes) which 
could generate violent conflicts (commonly ethnic clashes and civil strife). The Torontogroup 
expect environmental scarcity to become more influential in coming decades; more fragile 
ecosystems, increased population and extensive consumption (Homer-Dixon 1999: 5, 10-12, 
176). 
3.3.2 Cornucopianism 
 
There always will be temporary shortages and resource problems where there are strife, political 
blundering and natural calamities – that is where there are people. But the natural world allows, 
and the developed worlds promotes through the marketplace, responses to human needs and 
shortages… (Julian 1996: 588) 
 
Cornucopianism, with main support among neoclassical economists (Myers & Julian 1994: 
xiii) argue no strict limits to Earth in terms of population and consumerism. In contrast, 
Cornucopians uphold properly functioning markets (with for example regulating price 
mechanisms and support from institutions such as property rights) encourage conservation, 
resource substitution, technology innovation (for example deep sea extraction) and 
development of new sources of any scarce natural resources (for example via world trade) 
(Gleditsch 1998: 3; Ayres 1993: 189). Thus, Cornucopians believe natural resource scarcity 
triggers ingenuity and technological innovations tend to disarm concerns about the negative 
social effects of scarcity (Matthew 2008: 1). Throughout history, Cornucopians argue, new 
tools and new knowledge have made natural resources easier to obtain. Simon Julian stresses 
that in the long run there is no resource scarcity and practical limits to “improving our lot” 
are nonexistent. However, in the short run Cornucopianism uphold that all natural resources 
                                                 
35 “Ideas to solve problem” in a society, and determine how well society adapt to environmental scarcity. 
Chronic “ingenuity gap”, gap between required ingenuity to solve a problem and supply for ingenuity in the 
society make countries more vulnerable to the harsh social effects steaming from environmental scarcity. 
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are limited which could be understood as “shortage crisis” which result in pressure on supply, 
higher prices and possibly violence (Julian 1996:73, 580-581; Ayres 1993: 192). If people 
fight over natural resources, Cornucopians mean that is because of political interference with 
exploration and to avoid local scarcities natural resources must be properly priced and 
allowed to be traded (Gleditsch & Theisen 2006: 5). Cornucopianism argues that natural 
resources are getting more available rather than more scare; short term scarcities forces up 
prices on natural resources and triggers the search for new supplies and new solutions. New 
sources and subsidies are eventually found and these discoveries leaves humanity betters of 
than if the shortages had not occurred. A large population influence the production of 
knowledge (more minds to generate ideas). Thus, people are regarded as a resource in the 
long run rather than a burden to the environment. Human kind has experienced an 
unprecedented growth in human prosperity and in the last 40 years everyone, both developed 
and developing countries, have more access to clean drinking water and people will not run 
out of food or lose forests (Lomborg 2001: 328-329). The current outlook on the 
development of global warming does not indicate a catastrophe – technology will solve it. 
Lomborg argue that it is no imminent fear of environmental breakdown (Lomborg 2001: 331-
332). 
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3.4 Presentation of the analytical scheme 
Table 1 – The analytical scheme 
 Neo-Malthusianism Cornucopianism 
 
View of 
Present 
 
The EU believes that there are physical limits to 
population growth and consumerism regarding 
the maintenance of the planetary biosphere on 
which human enterprise is depending on. 
 
 
The EU believes that Earth’s environment and 
natural resources are turning scarcer and more 
polluted. Especially regarding climate change 
and scarcities in fish, cropland, water and forest 
(vulnerable ecosystem). 
 
The EU believes that environmental scarcity 
(supply, demand and structural) leads to 
negative social effects such as constrained 
agricultural productivity, constrained economic 
productivity, population movement, 
segmentation of society, weakening and 
disruption of institutions, insurgency and ethic 
clashes. The EU believes these negative social 
effects to produce violent conflicts, and 
threatens international security and peace. 
 
The EU believes that there are few, if any, physical 
limits to population growth and consumerism 
regarding the maintenance of the planetary 
biosphere on which human enterprise is depending 
on. 
 
The EU believes that the Earth’s environment and 
natural resources are turning less scarce and less 
polluted (resilient ecosystem). 
 
 
 
The EU believes that resource shortages can occur in 
a short time scale. Violent conflict could be present 
due to political interference with exploration. These 
resource shortages may cause shortage crises that 
could include violence, but can be avoided by price-
setting and trade. However, in the long term there is 
no scarcity in natural resources due to the capacity 
of human knowledge (for example technical 
innovations, substitution of scarce resources etc). 
 
View of 
Future 
 
The EU predicts that the state of the ecosystems 
will continue to worsen in the future, especially 
with regard to climate change and scarcities in 
water, cropland, forest and fish.  
 
The EU predict that the world, in particular 
developing countries, face complex, fast-
moving and interacting environmental scarcity 
which can lead to a spiral of violence, 
institutional dysfunction and social 
fragmentation which could hinder adaptive 
institutional and technological innovation. And 
thus, the EU believes that environmental 
scarcity induced violence will be frequent in the 
future and pose a pose a threat to broader 
regional and world security. The rate and extent 
of these conflicts are expected to increase. 
 
The EU predicts that the state of the ecosystems will 
get better in the future. The environment will 
become cleaner and possess more natural resources. 
For example Water or cropland will not be scarcer. 
 
The EU predicts no imminent threat of 
environmental scarcity induced conflicts in the 
future. The EU predicts no increase of 
environmental scarcity induced conflicts in the 
future. 
 
 
 
Scale 
 
Close to NM ideal 
 
Closer to NM ideal 
(more far from C ideal) 
 
 
Closer to C ideal  (more far 
from NM ideal) 
 
Close to C ideal 
 
For 
example 
 
Violence induced by 
environmental degradation 
will increase in the future. 
 
Violence induced by 
environmental 
degradation could 
increase in the future. 
 
Violence induced by 
environmental degradation 
will possibly not increase in 
the future. 
 
Violence induced by 
environmental degradation 
will not increase in the 
future. 
Time Short time = below a decade 
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4. Research findings 
Below the result from the text analysis and the informant interviews is presented and 
analysed. The presentations of the correlation and participation findings are in the end of this 
chapter merged in a discussion (4.3). Thus, this final result discussion connects the two parts 
in the thesis (4.1 and 4.2) and shows some of the main difficulties and obstacles with the 
realisation of the study. The results are related to the point of reference in this study. 
4.1 Correlation with the CFSP outcome? 
The view of the present and the view of the future are presented separately below followed 
by a brief summary of the results. 
4.1.1 The view of the present 
In the material reviewed for this text analysis there is a “logic of environmental scarcity” to 
be seen. Firstly, climate change is thought to be one main factor increasing renewable 
resource scarcity in for example water, arable land and fish stocks. The role of climate 
change with regard to renewable natural resource scarcity is clearly mentioned in both the 
ESS and the CCIS report. In accordance to the analytical scheme (see analytical scheme 
Table 1) climate change could be viewed as increasing supply induced scarcity. This could 
refer to a vulnerable ecosystem and that “any” environmental problem could increase 
resource scarcity: “climate change will heavily affect Europe’s natural environment…” 
(CCIS 2008:3) “the overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over 
natural resources [arable land, water, food and fish stocks]…” (CCIS 2008: 3) “competition 
for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the 
next decades” (ESS 2003: 2-3) and “… [the EU] recognise the link between global warming 
and competition for natural resources.”(CCIS 2008:3) Second, a factor that is understood to 
increase the consequences of climate change is demographic pressure which could be related 
to demand induced scarcity. According to the analytical scheme (see analytical scheme Table 
1) demand induced scarcity is embedded and at least given some support in the material. The 
statements “the consequences [of water scarcity] will be even more intense in areas under 
strong demographic pressure”(CCIS 2008:3) and “water stress and loss of agricultural 
productivity will make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing population…conflicts over 
remaining resources and unmanaged migration will lead to instability [in that region].” 
(CCIS 2008:5) express the role of demand induced scarcity. The statements make 
assumptions that population increase (by using pressure) will aggravate renewable resource 
scarcity, or the effects of supply induced scarcity. It could be derived to the belief in physical 
limits to population growth and consumerism of these renewable natural resources in the neo-
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Malthusian ideal type (see analytical scheme Table 1). Third, structural induced scarcity is 
also spotted in the material. It is understood as a factor that increases the consequences of 
climate change: “The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over 
depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised.” (CCIS 
2008:3) and “the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers are expected to see considerable reduction in 
their flows affecting Israel, the Palestinian territories and Jordan. Existing tensions over 
water are almost certain to intensify in this region leading to further political instability.” 
(CCIS 2008:5) The actual access to renewable natural resources is thought to contribute to 
the consequences of supply induced scarcity. Politicised access to already depleting resources 
could be connected to the distributional aspects in the neo-Malthusian view (see analytical 
scheme Table 1). Existing tensions over water are understood as intensifying the supply 
induced scarcity (reduction of water flow) effects. With reference to the analytical scheme 
(see analytical scheme Table 1) the view of the present assumes that supply, demand and 
structural induced scarcity could work in combination with each other (or one by one) in 
accordance to the neo-Malthusian ideal type (see analytical scheme Table 1). The decisions 
above can illustrate difficult decisions regarding where to place the statements; however, I 
interpret the statements closer to the neo-Malthusian ideal type, in comparison to the 
Cornucopian ideal type, also due to the time scale included, which is a crucial distinction 
between how the two ideal types views the present (see analytical scheme Table 1). In 
particular one statement above: “Competition for natural resources, - notably water - which 
will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades…” (ESS 2003: 2-3) includes 
information of time.36 Competition over natural resources is considered to be present over the 
next decades, which could be understood as a long term assessment that move away from the 
Cornucopian view of the present, that instead considers short run scarcity of natural resources 
to contribute to violence. The Cornucopian ideal type upholds that “shortages” of renewable 
natural resources can occur in a short time, but this view of the presence does not correlate 
with the material regarding this aspect (see analytical scheme Table 1). Also, in contrast to 
the Cornucopian ideal type there is indicators that natural resources are turning scarcer (see 
analytical scheme Table 1): “reduction of arable land, widespread shortage of water, 
diminishing food and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts are already 
happening in many parts of the world” (CCIS 2008: 3) together with the statement above 
“competition for natural resources…” (ESS 2003: 2-3) illustrate an association closer to a 
                                                 
36 During the realisation of the text analysis one difficulty was noticeable. It could be difficult to separate 
the timescale in the view of the present, with the view of the future. However, I believe that the use of time 
in the view of the present is different from the “view of the future”-level elaborated in section 5.1.2. The 
view of the present is not how they believe the development with e.g. conflicts to develop, rather how they 
view the present state of renewable natural resources which needs some kind of analyse of time to separate 
the two ideal types. 
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vulnerable ecosystem. The emphasise on aggravated competition over natural resources and 
diminishing food and fish stocks implies that the EU believes that renewable natural 
resources are scarce already and that they are turning scarcer. However, one might oppose to 
this by noticing that the material no not mention the word “scarcity”. Thus, why not place the 
statements closer to the Cornucopian view? First, remembering the timeframe is important 
(again, this is not the same as the “view of the future”-level elaborated in the section 5.1.2). 
Second, the view could be more far from the Cornucopian view because the material 
indicates some environmental changes as irreversible: “unmitigated climate change beyond 2 
degrees C will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of 
tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible, and largely unpredictable 
climate changes” (CCIS 2008: 2). Possible irreversible climate changes do not correlate well 
to the Cornucopian view of ecosystems that rather refers to a resilient ecosystem where 
Earth’s capacity is not declining (see analytical scheme Table 1). 
 What about social negative effects steaming from the “logic of environmental 
scarcity”? The EU believes that: “a drop in agricultural land productivity will lead to, or 
worsen, food-security in least developed countries, and an unsustainable increase in food 
prices across the board [due to climate change but also demographic pressure and 
politicised access]. Water shortage in particular has the potential to cause civil unrest and 
lead to significant economic losses, even in robust economies.” (CCIS 2008: 3) These 
indicated social negative effects such as constrained agricultural and economic productivity  
are implied by the neo-Malthusian view (see analytical tool Table 1). There is a distinction 
between developing and developed countries, but the material also indicated that developed 
countries (my interpretation of robust economies) could be affected by these social negative 
effects steaming from environmental scarcity. The social negative effects would also be 
affecting the EU, in for example significant economic losses and increased food prices. This 
is again a difficult distinction between the ideal types, because it could be interpreted to 
concern an imperfect market or trade system, which is emphasised by the Cornucopian ideal 
type (see Table 1). However I interpret it to be more far from the Cornucopian view because 
the material states that even robust economies can be affected. According to the Cornucopian 
ideal type it is primarily states with weak markets (my interpretation of robust economies) 
that will, possibly, be affected by shortages in renewable natural resources due to for example 
an imperfect market (see analytical scheme Table 1). This view could also be illustrated with 
the following statement: “Climate change will heavily affect Europe’s natural environment 
and nearly all sections of society and the economy.” (CCIS 2008: 3) Following the analytical 
scheme an assumption that high food prices will be regulate via the market by a “prise 
mechanism” or “allowance of international trade” is far fetched. This is then closer to the 
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neo-Malthusian ideal type in comparison to the Cornucopian ideal (se analytical scheme 
Table 1). Are there other social negative effects to be found in the material? The EU states 
that “water stress and loss of agricultural productivity [caused by climate change] leads to 
unmanaged migration” (CCIS 2008: 5) and regarding “environmentally-induced migration” 
(CCIS 2008: 4) the EU upholds that “…the effects of climate change…could amplify or 
trigger migration within and between countries…there will be millions of ‘environmental’ 
migrants by 2020…” (CCIS 2008: 4) and “migratory pressure at the European Union’s 
border” (CCIS 2008: 5) which illustrate that migration is though to be a social negative 
steaming from, at least, supply induced scarcity. Other social negative effects from 
environmental scarcity are weakening of institutions, insurgency and ethnic clashes (see 
analytical scheme Table 1) and they also receive some support in the material: “climate 
change significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the 
already limited capacity of governments [institutions] to respond effectively to the challenges 
they face…could trigger frustration, lead to tensions between different ethnic…groups within 
countries and to political radicalisation (CCIS 2008: 4). 
 If environmental scarcity and social negative effects steaming from environmental 
scarcity produce violent conflicts is not explicit in the material. The word conflict is 
mentioned “…climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources…” (CCIS 
2008: 3) “Conflicts over remaining resources…” (CCIS 2008: 5), but violent conflict is not 
mentioned. Still, that a conflict could be violent may possibly be implicit embedded in the 
material. The statement that “already today, climate change is having a major impact on the 
conflict [partly for agricultural land and water] in and around Darfur” (CCIS 2008: 5) could 
help determining if the EU could assume violent conflicts to be a result of environmental 
scarcity and social negative effects. This is a conflict that is estimated as a violent conflict 
because the EU has an ongoing operation in this region which includes a “civilian and a 
military component” in the ongoing conflict (the Council b; COM Interview 2008b). 
4.1.2 The view of the future 
 
Since the EU:s neighbours include some of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, e.g. 
North Africa and the Middle East, migratory pressure at the European Union’s border and 
political instability and conflicts could increase in the future (CCIS 2008: 5). 
 
Future is a vague word when comparing the neo-Malthusian and Cornucopian ideal type 
regarding the view of the future (se analytical scheme). Future could be next month, or it 
could be in hundred years from when the document was written. The material shows some 
unclear statements regarding what the EU predicts the future to be, e.g. “climate change is a 
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key element of international relations and will be increasingly so in the coming years”. 
However, other statements help estimate how the EU views the future. Remembering the 
statement “competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by 
global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory 
movements in various regions” (ESS 2003: 2-3) gives some directions on how the EU views 
the future development (not only the view of the present that was elaborated above). In this 
sense the EU predicts that competition over natural resources will be aggravated over the 
next decades and that turbulence and migration will increase (however, this is a social 
negative effect and not an actual violent conflict). Cornucopians would not indicate that 
competition over natural resources to worsen in the future. If following the analytical tool the 
Cornucopian ideal type assumes scarcity in the short term, below decades (see analytical 
scheme Table 1). The view of the future is more far from the Cornucopian ideal type, because 
the material emphasise that: “the impact of climate change on international security is not a 
problem of the future but already of today and one which will stay with us. Even if progress 
is made in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, weather patterns have already 
changed, global temperatures have already risen….” (CCIS 2008: 6). The EU also upholds 
that “desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts 
over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions” 
(CCIS 2008: 4) and that “the Nile Delta could be at risk from both sea-level rise and 
salinisation in agricultural areas while 12-15 % of arable land could be lost through sea-
level rise in this century.” (CCIS 2008: 6) The emphasis on vicious circle could possibly 
indicate a development with a more distant “end” than the one proclaimed by the 
Cornucopian ideal type. Even though vicious circle is a vague statement with regard of time, 
a longer time frame than decades strengthen the placement of the view of the future closer to 
the neo-Malthusian view in comparison to the Cornucopian view of the future (see analytical 
scheme Table 1).    
4.1.3 Brief summary of correlation findings 
The material points at a direction similar to the neo-Malthusian ideal type (that renewable 
resource scarcity is present and likely worsens over time). With guidance from the analytical 
scheme correlation between the neo-Malthusian ideal type and the CFSP outcome is, at least 
to some extent, visible in comparison with the Cornucopian ideal type. The logic of 
environmental scarcity could be considered embedded in the material, which is thought to 
lead to negative social effects for both developed and developing countries. It is also, at least 
implicitly, mentioned that these social negative effects could lead to instability and violent 
conflicts that are supposed to increase in the future. 
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4.2 Participation and linkages to the CFSP outcome? 
The data from the informant interviews are presented below. Participation in the CFSP 
process and linkages to the CFSP outcome by epistemic communities within the resource 
scarcity school are presented separately below followed by a brief summary. 
4.2.1 Participation in the CFSP negotiation 
The view from the text analyse was not objected to in the interviews. For example, the 
conflict in Darfur (that was mentioned in the CCIS report) was discussed: “we can never 
identify it [water and arable land scarcity] as the only factor explaining the conflict, because 
we don’t know. There is oil, ethnic tensions and climate change is making living more 
difficult. How these factors mix is very complex”, “loss of agricultural productivity is one 
negative effect of climate change. There is a climbing population, less land and more 
trouble” but also about climate change in general “in the coming 50 years the world map will 
be changed”, “climate change is not the origin of conflict, but climate change aggravates 
factors that may create conflict and tension [such as scarcity in renewable natural 
resources]” (COM Interview 2008b) 
 In the interviews there was an understanding that non-state actors had participated in 
the CFSP process wanting and aiming to influence the two reports. “The making of the CCIS 
report is an ongoing process with clear recognition of civil society… a commitment to 
include the civil society in the process and setting a partnership with civil society” (COM 
Interview 2008) and “there has been informal consulting with non-state actors to draft the 
CCIS document. The civil society had to sign up for the ‘peace building partnership’ to be 
able to be consulting. It was not an open consultation” (COM Interview 2008), “Yes [there 
was participation]. In the commission and the council workshop were held where non-state 
actors were invited to talk” (COUNCIL Interview 2008). The interviews expressed that civil 
society and non-state actors participated in the CFSP negotiation. The statements also express 
that non-state actors were aiming to influence the CFSP negotiation (in particular related to 
the CCIS report) because the non-state actors had to apply for joining the consultation. Civil 
society is vague when determining epistemic community participation, but the role of 
“academia” and “scientists” was also highlighted in the interviews which could refer to 
epistemic communities: “’academia’ is included in civil society, academia as well as other 
non-state actors. The process to draft the CCIS report took about one year and constituted of 
serious international conferences, workshops which included academia. The CCIS is a draft 
of what has been discussed in these conferences” (COM Interview 2008) “Academic [non-
state actor] or not have been taken into account. I don’t have a percentage [on if scientists 
participated more than other non-state actors]…, for example last year the Organisation for 
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Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) introduced environment security strategy 
process that helped informing our own line on the issue. They [OSCE] have prepared 
brainstorming workshops, inviting different NGO:s, the EU, scientists, analysts etc. It was a 
collective brainstorming experience – and we did that in “a low scale” last December [for 
the CCIS report].” (COUNCIL Interview 2008) According to the interviews epistemic 
communities was present (academia and scientists), but a clear distinction between epistemic 
communities and other non-state actors was not present: “I think that they [epistemic 
communities] were well motivated, maybe equal as other parts of civil society, all parties 
were active.” (COM Interview 2008) and “…workshop were held where non-state actors 
were invited to talk, for example the Institution for Environmental Security and the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development” (COUNCIL Interview 2008).   
4.2.2 Participation linked to the CFSP outcome? 
Communication between non-state actors (among them epistemic communities) and decision 
makers was verified: “Yes, it [participation, communication] was mutual; we are talking of 
proper consultation.” (COM Interview 2008) According to the interviews, civil society (were 
academia is a part) also had an effect on the CFSP outcome (at least the CCIS). The 
participation of epistemic communities (and other non-state actors) could be linked to the 
CFSP outcome. It could thereby be understood as partly shaping the CFSP outcome: 
“Absolutely yes [that the participation of non-state actors had an effect on the two 
documents] I think we have an excellent network of actors. The cooperation with the 
academia [as one example] is very good. We would have had a report [CCIS] with a lower 
profile if not including civil society. The report [CCIS] is approved by the council, but I think 
that implementation of the CCIS require more work via the peace building partnership” 
(COM Interview 2008), “Yes, this [input for the document, in particular the CCIS] is the 
purpose of the consultations. How much this participation can be linked to the outcome I 
don’t know, but the participation help seeing different views [of environmental security] and 
which direction we [the EU] could take.” (COUNCIL Interview 2008) The interviews do not 
uphold that epistemic communities (or “academia” and “scientists”) are considered to be 
particularly influential in affecting the outcome, even though they are mentioned as one non-
state actor that have an affect on (linked to) the CFSP outcome.  
4.2.3 Brief summary of participation and linkages findings 
The data collected from the interviews verified epistemic communities’ participation in the 
CFSP process, for example in workshops related to the CFSP outcome. Epistemic 
communities’ participation was also verified linked to the CFSP outcome. Epistemic 
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communities, among other non-state actors, were mentioned to have shaped the CFSP 
outcome, for example providing insights on the environmental security subject. 
4.3 None, low or high influence? 
By turning to the point of reference in this study,37 the two parts in this study (correlation and 
participation) could be united. Before determining this, however, some central difficulties in 
the realisation of the study must be addressed. 
 It is difficult to outline if epistemic communities with a neo-Malthusian view were 
present in the CFSP process and linked to the CFSP outcome. The interviews were conducted 
with departure from the text analysis results and the neo-Malthusian understanding in the 
CFSP outcome were understood as verified in the interviews. Thus, when the interview 
participants talked about “academia” and “scientists” in the CFSP process, this could have 
been in relation to this context. That it was epistemic communities with a neo-Malthusian 
understanding that participated in the CFSP negotiation could thereby be somewhat 
strengthen. However, this does not strengthen possible linkages between epistemic 
communities and the CFSP outcome. Even though the importance of “science” was 
mentioned in the interviews, there is no support that epistemic communities bring the 
scientific understanding into the CFSP outcome “more” than other non-state actors. 
 One other shortcoming in the interviews was to determine if the interview 
participants referred to the epistemic community definition used in this thesis. When 
mentioning “scientists” and “academia” it is quite uncertain if it is a sufficient indicator for 
measuring epistemic communities. The interview participants had little time to allocate for 
the informant interviews and it was hard to receive sufficient information about the epistemic 
communities that the interview participants claimed participated in the CFSP negotiation. 
One that was mentioned, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
describes it self as “a policy research institute dedicated to effective communication of our 
findings [for example to decision makers in government]” (IISD 2008). Even though this 
institute could constitute a “scientific institute” and be a measure of an epistemic community 
it is a challenging task to investigate.38 
  These are some main weaknesses for the discussion of low or high influence that was 
noticed during conducting the interviews. Yet, what can be stated about low or high 
influence? The informant interviews verified epistemic communities’ participation in the 
                                                 
37 Low influence: epistemic community participation in the CFSP negotiation was verified in interviews. 
High influence: epistemic community understandings correlate with the CFSP outcome, when participation 
of epistemic communities with this view is verified to have, at least partly, shaped the CFSP outcome and 
when this can be confirmed with other documentation. 
38 I also tried to get a list of the actors participating in the ”Peace Building Partnership” from the 
Commission to investigate further, but without success. 
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CFSP process. Following the criteria’s integrated in the point of reference, epistemic 
community could at least be considered enough for the low level of influence. What about 
high influence? The criteria for high influence could be thought to be fulfilled regarding the 
first to criteria’s (correlation was present and participation/linkages were verified), but not 
the third criteria that covers complementary documentation. Participation is a condition for 
linkages, and the result points in a direction for potential higher influence, but it can not be 
concluded with this study. Sources independent of the ones from the interviews are needed. 
Epistemic communities’ could have been a part of shaping the CFSP outcome, but one must 
remember that the empirical base provided here is thin to provide assumptions of high 
influence. 
5. Conclusions 
The overall conclusion is that epistemic communities could help understand how and why 
environmental issues have gained a place in the CFSP in the EU. 
 The thesis first question, how the EU incorporates environmental aspects in the CFSP 
outcome, is answered with guidance from the analytical tool elaborated in this study. The text 
analysis showed that the understandings of the resource scarcity school (the neo-Malthusian 
ideal type) were embedded in the CFSP outcome, at least to some extent if comparing with 
the Cornucopian understanding.  
 The thesis’ second question, if epistemic community participation in the CFSP 
negotiation can explain the CFSP outcome, is answered with guidance from the interview 
guide and the point of reference. The data from the interviews, related to the point of 
reference, showed that epistemic community participation in the CFSP negotiation could be 
concluded to be low. Key employees at the Commission and the Council verified epistemic 
community participation. Linkages between participation and the CFSP outcome were also 
verified, but it was harder to draw conclusions about high epistemic community influence on 
the CFSP outcome. 
6. Discussion  
Was the epistemic community theory helpful when striving to explain how and why 
environmental issues appear in international security politics? Even though there could be 
other factors for why environmental issues gain a place in international security politics, 
epistemic communities show to be a potential explanation in this study.  
 The study demonstrates that dependence for information is a feature in the CFSP 
negotiation regarding the incorporation of environmental issues (even though it is a security 
matter). It is tempting to draw parallels with the epistemic community theory assumption that 
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decision makers faced by uncertainty are “dependent”, or at least receptive, to knowledge and 
information provided and disseminated by epistemic communities. Epistemic community 
information and knowledge is noticeable, but it might not be epistemic community’s 
knowledge and information in particular that decision makers seek. Both epistemic 
communities and other non-state actors’ information are emphasised shaping the CFSP 
outcome. Thus, receptiveness for information is apparent, but not only circulated from 
epistemic communities.  
 The critic towards epistemic communities that the uncertainty in science it self could 
be used to delay instead of informing policy is not supported in this study. In contrast, the 
interviews pointed at the informative role of non-state actors, where epistemic communities 
are included to inform the documents. With a starting point also in the Copenhagen schools 
securitisation process, it is interesting that the influence of non-state actors, epistemic 
communities and others, were mentioned in the interviews without reflection regarding the 
possible motives behind wanting to securitize environmental issues. Even though non-state 
actors could provide useful insights for policy in an issue area, the Copenhagen school also 
uphold that the other side of the token which includes hidden motives for securitisation. 
 One difficulty with the methodological approach was to determine indicators for 
epistemic communities if mentioned in the interviews. Even though the interview participants 
referred to “scientists” and “academia” it might not be equal to the definition of an epistemic 
community. The interviews gave empirical support for epistemic communities’ effect on the 
CFSP outcome, but it is uncertain if the indicators for an epistemic community in the 
interviews, such as “scientists” and “academia” referrers to the “definition” of epistemic 
communities provided in the epistemic community theory. Is epistemic community 
measured? Or is it rather consultancy firms and think-tanks that interview participants refer 
to when mentioning “scientists” and “academia”? Even though determining if epistemic 
communities brought the understanding into the CFSP outcome is a truly difficult task 
(especially in relation to other non-state actors) one might conclude that the understandings 
of the resource scarcity school are translated into policy and that epistemic community is one 
explanation which, through more empirical studies, possibly could gain further explanatory 
potential. 
7. Further research 
Further research could focus on causality, context and indirect influence. First, it was beyond 
the scope of this thesis to separate epistemic communities from other non-state actors. To 
measure epistemic community influence without giving attention to other non-state actors is 
problematical in relation to outlining causality. To deepen our understanding if epistemic 
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communities, in particular, could explain why environmental issues are gaining place as an 
international security threat, further research could focus more on the participation side of 
influence. Extensive study of participation would strengthen, or falsify, the result in this 
study. Then estimation of relative influence, if some non-state actor was more successful than 
others might be possible. In this study, we were not able to measure if other non-state actors 
could have been carrying epistemic community understandings or if epistemic communities 
and other non-state actors worked in coalitions to inform the CFSP in the EU. Second, to 
validate this study (which has small ambitions to generalise) the analytical tool could also be 
used in other contexts, not only the EU. This could compare the results in this thesis with 
other contexts, for example the African Union. It would shed some light on if environmental 
issues in international security politics, such as climate change and renewable natural 
resource scarcity are interpreted in a similar way outside the EU. Third, due to the central 
position member states are argued to have in security politics, examination of indirect 
epistemic community influence, for example via the presidency in the Council, would be 
important. An intergovernmental approach would deepen the understanding of how epistemic 
community influence operates. 
More studies of epistemic communities’ impact on security politics would expand our 
knowledge in a field that has been considered immune to these “forces”. Even though more 
empirical studies are needed, this thesis showed that epistemic community is influential 
which makes it interesting to continue examining the “forces” of epistemic communities’ on 
international security politics. 
 
  38
8. Bibliography 
Adler, Emanuel & Haas, Peter M (1992) “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, 
 and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program” International Organization Vol: 
 46 (1) pp. 367-390. 
Andersson, Scott Åsa; Dreborg, Karl Henrik; Waleij, Annica & Wulff, Maria Elena (2007) 
 ”Miljösäkerhet – en översikt” Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut (FOI) FOI-R--
 2287--SE. 
Ayers, Robert U (1993) “Cowboys, Cornucopians, and Lon-Run Sustainability” Ecological 
 Economics Vol: 8 pp 189-207. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publisher BV 
Barkdull, John and Harris, Paul G. (2002) “Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: A 
 Survey  of Theory”. Global Environmental Politics Vol: 2 (2) pp. 63-91. 
Bengtsson, Rikard (2001) Perspektiv på Världspolitik Lund: Studentlitteratur 
Bergström, Göran and Boréus, Krisitina (2005) Textens Mening och Makt. Metodbok i 
 Samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys Lund: Student Litteratur 
Berlin, Daniel & Möller, Ulrika (2005) in Hållbar Utveckling som Politik: Om 
 Miljöpolitikens  Grundproblem  Sverker Jagers (red) Malmö: Liber 
Betsill, Michele M and Corell, Elisabeth (2008) NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of 
 Nongovernmental Organisations in International Environmental Negotiations. The 
 MIT  Press. 
Brown, Oli (2005) “The Environment and Security. How Our Understanding of the Links has 
 changed” International Institute for Sustainable Development 
Boehmer-Christiansen, Sonja (1996) The environment and international relations Routledge: 
 London. Vogel, John and Imber, Mark F (red) 
Buzan, Barry (1991) “New patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century” 
 International  Affairs Vol: 67 (3) pp. 431-451. 
Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole & de Wilde, Jaap (1998) Security: A Framework for Analysis. 
 London: Lynne Rienner Publisher. 
Bremberg, Niklas and Britz, Malena (2007) “EU Civil Protection and the New Security Role 
 of  the Union” Paper presented at the 6th Pan-European International Relations 
 Conference.  Standing Group on International Relations, Turin 12-15 September. 
Chalmers, Alan Francis (1999) What Is This Thing Called Science? Buckingham: Open 
 University Press. Third edition. 
Christensen Robert K (2006) “International Nongovernmental Organizations: Globalization, 
 Policy  Learning, and the Nation-State Public Administration” Journal of Public 
 Administration Vol: 29 (4-6) pp 281–303. 
  39
CCIS (2008) “Climate Change and International Security” Report from the European 
 Commission  and the Secretary-General/High Representative to the European 
 Council. 3 March (7249/08). Available online: 
  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/ 
 pressdata/EN/reports/99387.pdf (2008-03-14) 
COM Interview (2008a) EUROPEAN COMMISSION External Relations Directorate 
 General Directorate A, Crisis Platform, Policy Coordination in Common Foreign 
 Security Policy. Unit A 2 - Crisis Management and Peace Building, RELEX. Time 
 for interview with the Commission: 9.30, Wednesday, 7 May 2008. 
COM Interview (2008b) EUROPEAN COMMISSION External Relations Directorate 
 General Directorate A, Crisis Platform, Policy Coordination in Common Foreign 
 Security Policy. Unit A 2 - Crisis Management and Peace Building, RELEX. Time 
 for interview with the Commission: 13.30, Monday, 26 May 2008. 
COUNCIL Interview (2008) COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Planning Policy and Early 
 Warning  Unit, Policy Advisor. Time for interview with the Council: 12.30, 
 Wednesday, 15 May  2008 
Dalby, Simon (2002) “Security and Ecology in the Age of Globalisation” Environmental 
 Change and Security Project Report The Woodrow Wilson Center Vol: 8 pp. 95 - 
 109 
DN (2007) ”Extremism i Skuggan av Klimathotet” Dagens Nyheter 4 August 2007. 
 Available  online: http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=148&a=677057 
 (2008-03-11) 
De Soysa, Indira (2002) “Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot” Global Environmental 
 Politics Vol. 2 (4) pp. 1-34 
Dimond, Jared M (2006) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succed Chapter 10, 
 London: Penguin UK. 
Dunlop, Claire. (2000) “Epistemic Communities: A Reply to Toke” Politics Vol: 20 (3) pp. 
 137- 144. 
Elliot, Lorraine (2004) The Internationel Politics of the Environment. Palgrave: New York. 
Ehrlich, Paul R and Ehrlich, Anne H (1996) Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti 
 Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future. Washington, D.C.: Island Press 
Eriksson, Johan & Noren, Erik (2002) “Setting the Agenda of Threats: An Explanatory 
 Model” Uppsala Research Papers Uppsala University, Institution for Peace and 
 Conflict Research. 
  40
Esaiasson, Peter; Mikael, Gilljam; Henrik Oscarsson & Lena Wängneerud (2007) 
 Metodpraktikan. Konsten att Studera Samhälle, Individ och Marknad. Edition 3:1. 
 Nordstedts Juridik AB 
ESS (2003) “European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World” Brussels, 12 
 December 2003. Available online: 
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ 
 docs/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf (2008-03-12) 
Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace (2006) The Council of Ministers The European 
 Unions Series. Basingstoke: Macmillan  
Gleditsch, Nils Petter. (1998) “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the 
 Literature” Journal of Peace Research Vol: 35 (3) pp. 381-400 Special Issue on 
 Environmental  Conflict Sage Publications, Ltd. 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2001) “Environmental Change, Security, and Conflict”, in Chester, A. 
 Crocker, Fen Osler Hamspon and Pamela Aall (eds.): Turbulent Peace. The 
 Challenges of  Managing International Conflict. Washington D.C: United States 
 Institute of Peace Press 
Gleditsch N P. & Theisen O (2006) “Resources, the Environment and Conflict” Centre for 
 the Study of Civil War (PRIO). 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter and Nordås, Ragnhild (2007) “Climate Change and Conflict” Political 
 Geography pp.  627-638. 
Gleick Peter H (1998) “Water in crisis: Paths to Sustainable Water Use” Ecological 
 Application Vol: 8 (3) pp. 571 579. 
Graeger, Nina (1996) “Environmental Security” Journal of Peace Research Vol: 33 (1) pp. 
 109-116. 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H and Andresen, Steinar (2004) “NGO Influence in the Implementation of 
 the  Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks” Global 
 Environmental  Politics Vol: 4:4.  
Haas, M. Peter (1992) “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy” 
 International Organization. Vol: 46 (1) pp 1-35. Knowledge, Power, and 
 International  Policy  Coordination. 
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona & Wallace, Helen (2006) The Council of Ministers Basingstoke: 
 Macmillian 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F (1991) “On the Threshold. Environmental Changes as Causes of 
 Acute  Conflict” International Security Vol: 16 (2). 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F (1994) “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict. Evidence 
 from Cases” International Security Vol: 19 (1) pp. 5-40. 
  41
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F (1999) Environment, Scarcity and Violence Princeton N.J: 
 Princeton University Press 
Howorth, Jolyon (2004) “Discourse, Ideas and Epistemic Communities in European Security 
 and Defence Policy” West European Politics Vol: 27 (2) pp. 211-234. 
IISD (2008) http://www.iisd.org/about/ (2008-05-20) 
Jordan, Andrew (2005) Environmental Policy in the European Union. Actors, Institutions & 
 Processes Second edition. London: Sterling 
Julian, Simon L (1996) The Ultimate Resource 2 Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University 
 Press. 
Julian, Simon L (1994) “More People, Greater Wealth, More Resources, Healthier 
 Environment”  Economic Affairs 14 (3) pp. 22–29 
John W. Maxwell and Rafael Reuveny (2000) “Resource Scarcity and Conflict in Developing 
 Countries” Journal of Peace Research. Vol: 37 (3) pp. 301-322. 
Kaplan, Robert D (1994) “The Coming Anarchy” The Atlantic Monthly Vol: 273 (2) pp. 44-
 76. 
Kahl Colin H (1998) “Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored 
 Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93” International Security Vol: 23 (2) pp.80
 -119. 
Legro, Jeffrey W & Moravcsik, Andrew (1999) “Is anybody still a realist” International 
 Security Vol: 24 (2) pp. 5-55. 
Lomborg, Bjorn. (2001) The Skeptical Environmentalist. Measuring the Real State of the 
 World  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Matthew Richard A (2008) “Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge”
 International Peace Institute www.ipinst.org 
Myers, Norman and Simon, Julian L (1994) Scarcity or abundance?: A Debate on the 
 Environment New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Nugent, Niell & Paterson, William E. (2006) The Government and Politics of the European 
 Union  Palgrave, New York Union Series. Sixth edition 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr (1988) “Review: Neorealism and Neoliberalism” World Politics Vol: 40 (2) 
 pp. 235-251 
Rønnfeldt Carsten F (1997) “Three Generations of Environment and Security Research” 
 Journal of Peace Research Vol: 34 (4) pp. 473-482. 
Renner, Michael; Brown, Lori & Starke, Linda (2005) The State of the World 2005: a 
 Worldwatch  Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable Society London: 
 Earthscan 
  42
Sebenius, James K (1992) “Challenging Conventional Explanations of International 
 Cooperation:  Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities” 
 International  Organization Vol: 46 (1) pp. 323-365. Knowledge, Power, and 
 International Policy  Coordination. 
Smith, Michael E (2004) “Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level 
 Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common 
 Foreign and Security Policy” Journal of European Public Policy Vol: 11 (4) pp. 740-
 758  
SvD (2007) ”EU Får Tydlig Röst För Fred” Svenska Dagbladet 13 January 2008. Available 
 online: http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/artikel_767769 (2008-04-01) My 
 translation Swedish – English 
Sugden, Jennifer (2006) “Security Sector Reform: the Role of Epistemic communities in the 
 UK” Journal of Security Sector Management Vol: 4 (4) 
Toke, David (1999) “Epistemic Communities and Environmental Groups” Politics Vol: 19 
 (2) pp.  97-102. 
The European Commission (2008) http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/esdp/index.htm 
 (2008- 04-02) 
The Council (2008a)   
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&lang=SV&mode=g 
 (2008-03-04) 
The Council (2008b) 
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=956&lang=sv&mode=g  
 (2008-05-04) 
The Council (2008c) 
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/articles/99770.
 pdf (2008-02-10) 
Timura, Christopher T (2001) “Environmental Conflict and the Social Life of Environmental 
 Security Discourse” Anthropological Quarterly Vol: 74 (3) pp. 104-113. 
Tonra, Ben & Christiansen, Thomas (2004) Rethinking European Foreign and Security 
 Policy  Manchester University Press. 
Urdal, Henrik (2005) “People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, 
 and Armed Conflict Revisited” Journal of Peace Research Vol: 42 pp. 417-434. 
Weyand, Sabine (1999) Environmental Security: Just another green fashion? European 
 Union,  External Relations. European Communities: Italy. Office for Official 
 Publications of theEuropean Communities. 
  43
Yee, Albert S. (1996) “The Causal Effect of Ideas on Policy” International Organisation 
 Vol: 50 (1) pp. 69-108. 
Zito, Anthony R. (2001) “Expert Groups” Science and Public Policy Vol: 28 (6) pp. 465-476. 
  44
Appendix 1: Informant interview guide 
 
Theme 1: General introduction questions 
 
1. What is your exact position in the European Commission/the Council of Ministers? 
 
2. In my thesis I have been concentrating on the European Security Strategy and the report 
Climate Change and International Security. I understand that you have been partly 
responsible for/involved in the process regarding the Climate Change and International 
Security report/European Security Strategy. Is this correct? 
 
3. I also understand that these documents express a link between global warming and 
increased competition over natural resources (especially water) which could contribute to 
migration and possibly even conflict now and over time. Could you, briefly, explain how 
you believe this development to include environmental aspects in the CFSP started? What 
do you believe is the main influences? 
 
 
Theme 2: Participation? 
 
1. The European Security Strategy and the Climate Change and International Security report 
express that resource scarcity could contribute to conflicts and that this could increase in the 
future. What have brought this understanding into the CFSP of the EU? 
 
2. Do you believe that non-state actors have participated in the “CFSP process”? (For 
example via meetings, conferences, advice)  
 
3. Do you believe that non-state actors have participated in the “CFSP process” wanting and 
aiming to influence these two documents? 
 
4. Do you believe that scientific communities (or single scientists) have engaged in the 
“CFSP negotiation”, wanting and aiming to influence these two documents? What role did 
scientific communities (or single scientists) have in the CFSP process in relation to these two 
documents? 
 
5. In comparison to other non-state actors, do you believe that scientific communities (or 
single scientists) in particular have engaged in the “CFSP process” wanting and aiming to 
influence these two documents? (Scientific communities (and single scientists) or other non-
state actors?) 
 
6. Could you give an example of scientist’s participation relating to the ESS or CCIS? What 
kind of activities did scientific communities (or single scientists) engage in? 
 
7. Could you give an example of scientific communities/network/scientists that has been 
participating in the “CFSP negotiation”? 
 
If totally “no, scientific community was not present at all”: 
When the understanding from environmental security research (resource scarcity) is 
compared to the CFSP (ESS and CCIS) a correlation is at least partly visible. What brought 
this into the CFSP? Could you explain that a bit further what you believe brought this 
understanding into the two documents? 
 
Help questions: 
Could you tell me more about this? 
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Could you explain this a bit further? 
Do you mean that…? 
 
 
Theme 3: Process tracing and Counter Factual 
 
1. Which scientific communities (or single scientists) were decision-makers aware of in the 
“CFSP negotiation”? 
 
2. Would you say that there was communication (for example conferences, hearings, advice 
giving) between scientific communities (or single scientists) and decision-makers in the 
“CFSP negotiation”? 
 
3. Do you believe that this communication between scientific communities (or single 
scientists) was valuable to the decision-makers when the two documents the CCIS and ESS 
was formulated?  
 
4. Do you believe that the outcome of the two documents, with regard to the incorporation 
environmental aspects, would be different if scientific communities (or single scientists) did 
not advice and advocate their understanding of environment and security? 
 
5. Do you believe that the participation of scientific communities (or single scientists) had an 
effect on the CFSP outcome (the two documents)? 
 
6. Could participation in the “CFSP process” by scientific communities (or single scientists) 
be linked to the content of the two documents (ESS and CCIS)? 
 
 
Theme 4: Ending 
 
1. Is there something more you would like to add regarding this before the interview is 
coming to an end? 
 
2. Do you wish to be anonymous in my thesis? Or could I mention your name in the thesis?  
 
3. If any more questions turn up later on, is it all right to contact you via e-mail or phone 
again? 
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Appendix 2 – Information Regarding Informant Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
At the present I am writing my master thesis for the department of political science at 
Göteborg University. 
 
The thesis addresses environmental security in the European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. It should contribute to the knowledge of how environmental aspects are 
incorporated in the CFSP and also why this development is taken place. The European 
Security Strategy and the Climate Change and International Security report express a link 
between global warming and increased competition over natural resources (especially water) 
which may result in migration and conflicts. To understand why this view is incorporated in 
these documents is the focal point of the interviews. 
 
Interviews with key persons in the CFSP process are necessary for the realisation of the 
study. Your participation in an interview would be highly appreciated and important to fulfil 
the thesis purpose. The time duration of an interview would be approximately 30 minutes and 
the interviews will be anonymous.  
 
If you are able to participate in an interview, please let me know what date would be the most 
suitable for you. For further information about the study, please contact me or my advisor 
Ulrika Möller. Contact details are listed below. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Elin Israelsson 
 
 
 
 
Advisor:        Author: 
Ulrika Möller        Elin Israelsson 
ulrika.moller@pol.gu.se       eisraelsson@gmail.com 
0046 (0) 31 786 1241       0044 (0) 79 42 557 459 
 
